"Death to America"

Iran's Covert War

Iran’s repeated calls for “Death to America” have long been its official slogan. An analysis of what that has meant reveals a clear, unmistakable pattern. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not fought the United States in a conventional, declared war. Instead, it has waged a long, grinding campaign of asymmetric conflict: proxy warfare, terrorism, covert operations, and periodic direct strikes. In more recent decades, the steady advance of a nuclear program has entirely changed the strategic calculus.

And the slogans do matter, because in this case, they are not incidental. The phrase “Death to America” (Persian: Marg bar Amrika) has functioned as an enduring piece of revolutionary political language inside Iran.

“Death to America” has been chanted at state-organized events, embedded in official commemorations, and echoed by senior figures in the regime since the time of Ruhollah Khomeini. Iranian leaders have periodically argued that the phrase refers to opposition to U.S. policies rather than the American people. But whatever the semantic defense, it has remained part of the system’s political vocabulary for over four decades. “Death to America” is repeated in parliament, at rallies, and in state media. In that sense, it is not just street rhetoric. It has been normalized as part of the revolutionary “party line.”

It began immediately. The 1979 embassy takeover in Tehran was not just a spontaneous student protest. It was endorsed and sustained by the revolutionary regime. Fifty-two American diplomats were held hostage for 444 days. That act alone reset U.S.–Iran relations for a generation and established the tone. This was not rhetoric. This was action.

From there, the strategy evolved, but the objective did not.

Iran built and cultivated proxy forces, most notably Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a Lebanon-based group founded in the 1980s with backing from Iran that operates simultaneously as a militia, a political party, and a social service network. It is widely regarded as Iran’s most important regional proxy, receiving funding, training, and weapons while advancing Iranian strategic interests.

Hezbollah holds seats in Lebanon’s government but also maintains a powerful armed wing responsible for attacks on U.S. and Israeli targets, leading the United States Department of State and others to designate it as a terrorist organization.

Iran’s proxy network is not abstract; it is built around a handful of core groups that do the regime’s work on the ground. Alongside Hezbollah, are Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and a cluster of Shia militias in Iraq, such as Kata'ib Hezbollah. Different geographies, different sectarian roots, but the same pattern: funding, training, and strategic direction flowing from Iran, allowing it to project force, bleed adversaries, and maintain deniability without engaging in direct war.

Through these proxies, Iran has struck American targets with plausible deniability. The 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut. The Marine barracks bombing later that same year, which killed 241 American servicemen. The Khobar Towers bombing in 1996. These were not isolated incidents. They were part of a method. Iran does not need to pull the trigger if it can train, fund, and direct those who will.

That model scaled. Over the past several decades, Iran has supported a network of aligned groups: Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Shia militias in Iraq, and more recently the Houthis in Yemen.

What is often called the “axis of resistance” is not just a slogan. It is an operational framework. Through it, Iran has extended its reach across the Middle East, targeting U.S. personnel, facilities, and allies without engaging in open-state warfare.

Nowhere has that been more evident than in Iraq. During the post-2003 conflict, Iran-backed militias were supplied with weapons, training, and increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive devices. U.S. officials have long attributed hundreds of American deaths to these groups. Again, not conventional war, but real casualties, real consequences.

Over the last decade, and at sea, the pattern repeats. Iran has harassed U.S. naval vessels, mined shipping lanes, seized tankers, and threatened the free flow of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz. These actions are calibrated and aggressive enough to signal capability and intent, but often just below the threshold that would trigger full-scale retaliation.

The line between proxy and direct action has blurred. Missile and drone attacks on U.S. bases in the region, particularly in Iraq and Syria, have been attributed to Iran-backed groups, but in some cases bear the clear signature of Iranian planning and coordination. Retaliatory strikes following high-profile events have demonstrated both capability and willingness to escalate, at least to a point.

Layered on top of this is a quieter, less visible campaign: cyber operations, intelligence work, and alleged assassination plots. U.S. officials have repeatedly warned of efforts to target American personnel, both abroad and within the United States.

Presidential Assassination Attempts

In 2024, federal prosecutors charged and later secured a conviction against an operative tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who had entered the United States to recruit hitmen for political assassinations, including Trump, though the plot was disrupted before any attack occurred. Additional cases and intelligence briefings have pointed to similar “kill team” concepts and surveillance efforts.

What if that assassination attempt had been successful? Would we have gone to war with Iran then? Why did this assassination attempt and conviction hardly make headline news?

A list of recent assassination attempts by Iran on American soil is listed at the end of the references for this article.

And then there is the nuclear question.

Iran’s nuclear program has advanced in fits and starts over decades, but the trajectory is unmistakable. Facilities such as Natanz Nuclear Facility and Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant have enabled uranium enrichment at increasingly higher levels. While Iran maintains that its program is for peaceful purposes, international monitoring bodies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, have repeatedly raised concerns about enrichment levels, transparency, and compliance.

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) temporarily constrained aspects of the program in exchange for sanctions relief. But following U.S. withdrawal in 2018 and subsequent Iranian steps away from compliance, enrichment levels increased, stockpiles grew, and monitoring became more limited. Today, Iran is widely assessed to be much closer to “breakout” capacity. That is the ability to produce more weapons-grade material on short notice than at any point in its history.

Whether Iran intends to build a nuclear weapon remains officially unresolved. But capability matters. A near-threshold nuclear state operating alongside an established doctrine of proxy warfare and asymmetric conflict presents a fundamentally different level of risk.

So when people ask whether the chant “Death to America” is just rhetoric, the historical record suggests otherwise. It has not translated into a conventional war. But it has been consistently accompanied by actions that impose real costs and, increasingly, by the development of capabilities that could dramatically raise the stakes.

The better way to understand this is not as a series of disconnected events, but as a doctrine. Avoid direct confrontation. Use proxies. Maintain deniability. Apply pressure over time. Build strategic leverage.

This is not noise. It is a strategy. It is covert warfare, fought over decades.

The only questions that remain are… when is enough, enough? And who is willing to support those who finally decide to take action after years of clear provocation?

JGM

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References

• U.S. Institute of Peace – Iran Primer (history, rhetoric, and state-sponsored events)

• Council on Foreign Relations – Iran–U.S. relations and conflict tracker

• Congressional Research Service – Reports on Iran’s military power and regional proxy network

• U.S. Department of State – Country Reports on Terrorism

• Department of Defense – Statements on Iran-backed militia activity

• International Atomic Energy Agency – Safeguards and monitoring reports on Iran

• Arms Control Association – Iran nuclear program analysis

• Brookings Institution – Research on Iran’s regional strategy

• Foundation for Defense of Democracies – Analyses of Iran’s military and nuclear posture

• United Nations – Sanctions, resolutions, and nuclear oversight

• “Member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Charged with Plot to Murder the Former National Security Advisor” https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/member-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-charged-plot-murder-former-national?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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Foiled assassination plots and attempts on American soil (modern era):

1. 2011: Saudi Ambassador plot U.S. officials alleged a plot tied to the Iranian government to assassinate Saudi Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir in Washington, D.C. Iranian nationals Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri were charged with plotting to kill him at a restaurant using a bomb, and also discussed bombing the Saudi and Israeli embassies. Wikipedia

2. 2021: Kidnapping of Masih Alinejad The Justice Department charged four alleged Iranian intelligence operatives with trying to kidnap journalist and activist Masih Alinejad, with a plan to take her by speedboat to Venezuela and ultimately back to Iran to stand trial. NBC News

3. 2022: Murder of Masih Alinejad (second attempt) Federal prosecutors charged three members of an Eastern European criminal organization with trying to kill Alinejad. She survived because she failed to answer her door in Brooklyn when a man with an assault rifle rang the bell. He left, ran a stop sign, and was arrested — unraveling the plot. NBC News

4. 2022: Plot to kill John Bolton Federal prosecutors charged IRGC member Shahram Poursafi with trying to hire assassins to kill former White House National Security Advisor John Bolton for $300,000. He also had a second unnamed target he was willing to pay up to $1 million to have killed. Fox News

5. 2024: Plot targeting Trump, Biden, and Nikki Haley IRGC-linked operative Asif Merchant was sent to the U.S. and directed to arrange the murders of Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Nikki Haley. He met with supposed hitmen who were actually undercover FBI agents in New York, and was arrested in July 2024. CBS News

6. 2024: Separate Trump assassination plot (Farhad Shakeri) The DOJ announced charges against Farhad Shakeri, an IRGC asset in Tehran, who was told by IRGC officials to focus solely on Trump and formulate a plan within seven days. Two American co-conspirators in New York were also charged for allegedly helping surveil targets. CNN

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Other threats and targeted individuals: Other officials placed on Iran’s hit list include former National Security Advisors John Bolton and Robert O’Brien, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former Defense Secretary Mark Esper, General Kenneth McKenzie, and former Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook, all of whom reportedly required Secret Service protection long after leaving their posts.